Why It Is Dangerous When Politicians Tell Active-Duty Troops to Disobey Orders

In recent days, a troubling political trend has emerged: elected officials, commentators, and public figures have urged active-duty military personnel to “refuse illegal orders” based on political views rather than actual law. This rhetoric is dangerous. It threatens civilian control of the military, undermines the chain of command, and exposes service members to serious criminal liability under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), including Articles 90, 91, and 92.

This article explains, using U.S. and international law, what makes an order lawful or unlawful, who decides, and why political actors outside the chain of command have no authority to instruct troops to disobey. It draws on the U.S. Constitution, the War Powers Resolution, the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act, the Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocol I, the U.N. Charter, and the Department of Defense Law of War Manual.

Quick Navigation

• Part I – The Actual Law Governing Orders, Obedience, and Refusal
• Part II – Why Political Encouragement to Disobey Is Dangerous
• Part III – History and Modern Practice (Clinton, Obama, Trump-Era Operations)
• Frequently Asked Questions
• Legal Sources and Authorities

Part I – The Actual Law Governing Orders, Obedience, and Refusal

1. The Presumption of Lawfulness

Under U.S. military law, any order issued by a superior within the chain of command is presumed lawful. This presumption is essential to discipline and mission effectiveness. The UCMJ enforces obedience through punitive articles:

• Article 90 – Willfully disobeying a superior commissioned officer
• Article 91 – Insubordinate conduct toward warrant officers, NCOs, and petty officers
• Article 92 – Failure to obey an order or regulation

Without the presumption of lawfulness, every mission would bog down in individual second-guessing. The default rule is clear: service members must obey lawful orders.

2. Elements of a Lawful Order

Courts-martial, the Manual for Courts-Martial, and the Department of Defense Law of War Manual recognize several core requirements for a lawful order:

• Issued by a competent authority within the service member’s chain of command
• Related to a valid military duty or purpose
• Consistent with the U.S. Constitution and federal statutes
• Not in conflict with higher lawful orders
• Not directing a crime or violation of the law of armed conflict

An order that satisfies these criteria is lawful even if it is controversial, unpopular, or politically divisive.

3. The Narrow Duty to Refuse Manifestly Unlawful Orders

Service members are not expected to act as robots. They have a duty to refuse orders that are manifestly unlawful, orders that are clearly criminal on their face. This duty is rooted in U.S. military law, the post–World War II Nuremberg jurisprudence, and modern international humanitarian law, including the Geneva Conventions and their grave breach provisions and Additional Protocol I article 51 on protection of civilians.

Examples of manifestly unlawful orders include commands to:

• Intentionally kill or target civilians who are not taking part in hostilities
• Torture or inhumanely treat detainees
• Direct attacks against hospitals, schools, or clearly civilian objects without military necessity
• Commit rape, pillage, or other acts that qualify as war crimes

These are not close calls. A person of ordinary sense would recognize such orders as criminal, and following them can lead to prosecution in U.S. courts-martial or international tribunals.

4. Political Disagreement Is Not a Legal Standard

By contrast, an “illegal order” is not simply a policy that some citizens or politicians dislike. Legality is determined by law, not by polls or social media. The War Powers Resolution, codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1550, governs when and how the President may introduce U.S. forces into hostilities and requires consultation and reporting to Congress. It does not convert every disputed use of force into an unlawful order for the individual troop.

The operative question for a service member is not “Is this operation controversial?” but rather “Does this specific order require me to commit a clear crime under U.S. or international law?” If the answer is no, the order is presumed lawful and must be obeyed.

Part II – Why Political Encouragement to Disobey Is Dangerous

5. Who Actually Exercises Civilian Control of the Military

American tradition and law place the military under civilian control, but that control runs through defined offices:

• The President as Commander in Chief (U.S. Const. art. II, § 2)
• The Secretary of Defense and other civilian officials empowered by statute
• The commissioned officers appointed and confirmed under law

Members of Congress, governors, retired officers on television, and private activists are important voices in public debate, but they are not in the chain of command. Their statements carry no legal authority for an individual Soldier, Sailor, Marine, Airman, Guardian, or Coast Guardsman.

6. How Political Interference Undermines Discipline

When politicians encourage troops to reject orders based on partisan views, several risks emerge:

• Confusion over who has lawful command authority
• Fragmentation along ideological lines inside units
• Hesitation or paralysis during fast-moving operations
• Breakdown of the principle of unity of command

The Department of Defense Law of War Manual emphasizes both the duty to obey lawful orders and the limited, carefully defined duty to disobey clearly unlawful ones. It does not support a free-form right to disregard orders whenever political actors claim a mission is “illegal.”

7. The Real Consequences for Service Members

Refusing a lawful order can lead to severe consequences under the UCMJ:

• Court-martial conviction for violating Articles 90, 91, or 92
• Confinement and loss of pay and benefits
• Dishonorable or other punitive discharge
• Administrative separation with a damaging characterization of service

The politician or commentator who told the troop to disobey faces no UCMJ charges, no confinement, and no discharge paperwork. The legal risks fall entirely on the service member.

8. Misleading Claims That Whole Categories of Orders Are “Automatically Illegal”

Political rhetoric has increasingly labeled certain missions as inherently illegal, including:

• Domestic deployments to respond to civil unrest or natural disasters
• Border security support operations
• Maritime interdictions targeting narco-trafficking vessels
• Strikes against hostile vessels at sea

These missions raise serious policy and constitutional questions, and the War Powers Resolution, the Insurrection Act (10 U.S.C. §§ 251–255), and other statutes define when and how they may occur. But that debate takes place in Congress, in the courts, and inside the executive branch—not at the level of the individual rifleman, pilot, or surface warfare officer deciding whether to obey a specific, vetted order.

For the individual service member, the legal question remains: does the order require clearly criminal conduct, such as attacking civilians in violation of the Geneva Conventions or Additional Protocol I article 51, or using force in a way that obviously violates the law of armed conflict? If not, the order is lawful and must be carried out.

Part III – History and Modern Practice: Clinton, Obama, and Trump-Era Operations

9. Clinton’s Air Operations in Bosnia and Kosovo

President Bill Clinton authorized extensive air operations in Bosnia and later Kosovo under NATO mandates, without a formal declaration of war. These campaigns, especially the 1999 air war in Kosovo, generated intense debate over the scope of presidential power, the application of the War Powers Resolution, and the role of Congress. The House refused to pass a resolution explicitly authorizing continued operations, yet the administration continued the campaign under its interpretation of Article II authority.

During these operations, NATO forces conducted strikes that resulted in severe controversy, including the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade and strikes that hit civilian facilities, including a hospital. These events raised hard questions about targeting, intelligence reliability, distinction, and proportionality under the law of armed conflict and Additional Protocol I article 51. Still, no serious movement emerged urging U.S. pilots or aircrew to disobey orders on the theory that the campaign itself was “illegal.” The legal and constitutional arguments were aimed at the President and Congress, not at line aircrew.

10. Obama’s Libya Intervention and Expanded Drone Operations

The 2011 Libya intervention and the broader targeted killing program under President Barack Obama further stretched executive views of war powers. Critics argued that continuing air operations in Libya without congressional authorization violated the War Powers Resolution, and that certain strikes in the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia raised U.N. Charter Article 2(4) and Article 51 self-defense concerns.

Congressional lawsuits and scholarly criticism followed. Yet even in the most critical commentary, the focus remained on whether the President had complied with 50 U.S.C. chapter 33 and international law, not on telling drone operators or pilots that their orders were facially unlawful. Those operators executed targets vetted through joint targeting processes, guided by rules of engagement, and informed by legal review grounded in the Geneva Conventions and the DoD Law of War Manual.

11. Trump-Era Maritime Interdictions Against Narco-Trafficker Boats

Under the Trump administration, U.S. Navy and Coast Guard forces conducted intensified interdiction missions against cartel-affiliated vessels in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific. Some of these operations were framed as targeting “narcoterrorists.” They took place against the backdrop of the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act, which criminalizes drug trafficking on certain vessels (46 U.S.C. ch. 705, including § 70503), and standing rules of engagement based on national and unit self-defense.

These missions involved:

• High-speed chases of suspected smuggling vessels and semi-submersibles
• Use of lethal force against narco trafficking vessels
• Operations near waters influenced by hostile or uncooperative regimes, raising diplomatic and escalation concerns

Critics argued that framing cartels as quasi-military enemies risked eroding the line between law enforcement and armed conflict. Supporters contended that heavily armed cartel fleets functioned as de facto paramilitary organizations threatening U.S. and partner forces. Those disputes belong to Congress, the courts, and international forums. For individual sailors, Marines, aviators, and Coast Guardsmen on scene, orders to interdict or engage a vessel are lawful so long as they comply with the rules of engagement, the law of armed conflict, and self-defense directives drawn from the U.N. Charter and customary international law.

12. Domestic Deployments to Cities and the Insurrection Act Framework

The Trump administration also deployed National Guard forces and federal assets in several U.S. cities during periods of unrest. These deployments rely on a complex legal framework that includes state control of the Guard, federalization authorities, and the Insurrection Act (10 U.S.C. §§ 251–255), which permits the President under defined conditions to use the armed forces to enforce federal law and suppress insurrection or domestic violence that obstructs constitutional rights.

Whether particular deployments were wise, necessary, or proportionate is a political and constitutional question, and scholars continue to debate those issues. But an order directing a National Guard member or active-duty service member to deploy to a city in support of civil authorities is not, by itself, a manifestly unlawful order. It becomes unlawful only if it directs clearly criminal conduct—for example, the intentional shooting of peaceful civilians in violation of domestic law and the protections for civilians under the Fourth Geneva Convention and other humanitarian law instruments.

Frequently Asked Questions

Core Legal Questions

Conclusion: The Rule of Law Protects Troops and the Republic

The American military depends on disciplined obedience to lawful orders and a carefully limited duty to refuse manifestly unlawful ones. Political efforts to drag active-duty personnel into partisan fights over war powers or foreign policy put service members in legal danger and erode vital civil-military norms.

History shows that presidents from both parties have pushed the boundaries of war powers, from Clinton in the Balkans, to Obama in Libya and beyond, to Trump in maritime interdictions and domestic deployments. Those disputes are real and important, but they are resolved through constitutional mechanisms—Congress, courts, diplomacy, and public debate—not by asking individual troops to become freelance constitutional interpreters on the battlefield or at sea.

The enduring legal standard is straightforward:

• Troops must obey lawful orders.
• Troops must refuse orders that are clearly and unmistakably unlawful.
• Political rhetoric cannot redefine either category.

This clarity protects the chain of command, safeguards individual service members, and upholds the oath to support and defend the Constitution. The military cannot become a political weapon. That means letting established law—not partisan messaging—govern obedience and refusal.

Legal Sources and Authorities Referenced

• Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), Articles 90, 91, 92 – 10 U.S.C. §§ 890–892 (willful disobedience, insubordinate conduct, failure to obey orders)
• War Powers Resolution – 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1550 (purpose, consultation, reporting, and congressional control over hostilities)
• Insurrection Act – 10 U.S.C. §§ 251–255 (federal aid to states, use of militia and armed forces to enforce federal authority and suppress insurrections)
• Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act – 46 U.S.C. ch. 705, including § 70503 (prohibited drug trafficking acts on vessels)
• U.N. Charter, Articles 2(4) and 51 (prohibition on the use of force and the inherent right of self-defense)
• Geneva Conventions of 1949, especially the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (e.g., arts. 27, 32, 147)
• Additional Protocol I of 1977, Article 51 (protection of the civilian population from attack)
• Department of Defense Law of War Manual (2016 and subsequent updates), sections addressing the duty to obey lawful orders and to disobey manifestly unlawful ones